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ABSTRACT
Ensuring the privacy of sensitive data used to train modern ma-
chine learning models is of paramount importance in many areas
of practice. One approach to study these concerns is through the
lens of differential privacy. In this framework, privacy guarantees
are generally obtained by perturbing models in such a way that
specifics of data used to train the model are made ambiguous. A
particular instance of this approach is through a “teacher-student”
framework, wherein the teacher, who owns the sensitive data, pro-
vides the student with useful, but noisy, information, hopefully
allowing the student model to perform well on a given task without
access to particular features of the sensitive data. Because stronger
privacy guarantees generally involve more significant perturbation
on the part of the teacher, deploying existing frameworks funda-
mentally involves a trade-off between student’s performance and
privacy guarantee. One of the most important techniques used in
previous works involves an ensemble of teacher models, which
return information to a student based on a noisy voting procedure.
In this work, we propose a novel voting mechanism with smooth
sensitivity, which we call Immutable Noisy ArgMax, that, under
certain conditions, can bear very large random noising from the
teacher without affecting the useful information transferred to the
student.
Compared with previous work, our approach improves over the
state-of-the-art methods on all measures, and scale to larger tasks
with both better performance and stronger privacy (ϵ ≈ 0). This
new proposed framework can be applied with anymachine learning
models, and provides an appealing solution for tasks that requires
training on a large amount of data.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Usability in security and privacy;
Privacy protections; • Computing methodologies → Neural
networks.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed impressive breakthroughs of deep
learning in a wide variety of domains, such as image classifica-
tion [20], natural language processing [8], and many more. Many
attractive applications involve training models using highly sensi-
tive data, to name a few, diagnosis of diseases with medical records
or genetic sequences [3], mobile commerce behavior prediction
[36], and location-based social network activity recognition [18].
In fact, many applications lack labeled sensitive data, which makes
it challenging to build high performance models. This may require
the collaboration of two parties such that one party helps the other
to build the machine learning model. For example in a “teacher-
student” framework, where the teacher owns the sensitive data and
well-trained model to transfer its knowledge and help the student to
label the unlabeled dataset from the student side. However, recent
studies exploiting privacy leakage from deep learning models have
demonstrated that private, sensitive training data can be recovered
from released models [27]. Therefore, privacy protection is a criti-
cal issue in this context, and thus developing methods that protect
sensitive data from being disclosed and exploited is critical.
In order to protect the privacy of the training data and miti-
gate the effects of adversarial attacks, various privacy protection
works have been proposed in the literature [23, 25, 28, 32]. The
“teacher-student” learning framework with privacy constraints is
of particular interest here, since it can provide a private student
model without touching any sensitive data directly [19, 29, 31].
The original purpose of a teacher-student framework is to transfer
the knowledge from the teacher model to help train a student to
achieve similar performance with the teacher. To satisfy the privacy-
preserving need, knowledge from the teacher model is carefully
perturbed with random noise, before being passed to the student
model. In this way, one hopes that an adversary cannot ascertain
the contributions of specific individuals in the original dataset even
they have full access to the student model. Using the techniques of
differential privacy, such protection can be guaranteed in certain
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed approach: first, the private data is partition to non-overlapping splits to train the teacher
models. To train the studentmodel, the ensemble of teachers then aggregate their predictions on the queried example from the
student, followed by adding a large constant on the highest counted class vote. The count vector then gets randomly perturbed
with noise followed by anArgMax operation. Finally, the studentmodel is trained by using the returned label from the teacher
ensemble.
settings. However, the current teacher-student frameworks (e.g.
[27] and [30]) involve a trade-off between student’s performance
and privacy. This is because the amount of noise perturbation re-
quired is substantial to ensure privacy at the desired level, which
leads to degraded information passed to the student and results in
sub-optimal models. We summarize some challenges of the current
teacher-student framework:
• Unavoidable trade-off between performance and privacy
cost. The main challenge is the trade-off between performance
and privacy cost. In order to protect the dataset, for each query,
large noise needs to be added to perturb the output and return
the noisy feedback to the student side. However, when the pertur-
bation is significant, the returned feedback could be misleading
as compared to the original information. Therefore, this is a fun-
damental trade-off for current methods, i.e. one has to choose to
balance between privacy and performance.
• Hard to set reasonable privacy budget. In practice, due to
the trade-off described above, it is difficult to decide the privacy
budget and noise scale for each query. This is because there is an
inherent conflict between the student and teacher, i.e. one prefers
a useful model and the other is more concerned on protecting
sensitive data.
• Large number of teacher models. To use less privacy cost per
query, larger perturbation is required. To make sure the returned
feedback is still useful after severe perturbation, a large number
of teacher models is required. The hope is that with more models
on the teacher side, the meaningful feedback gets more vote and
thus can tolerate higher level of noise. However, this brings some
new challenges. First, toomany teacher models on subset datasets
may result degradation of teacher ensemble performance, since
each model is effectively trained with much less data. Second,
because of the above, the teacher side now has to determine how
to balance the number of data subsets and the performance of
the model, which make the process a lot more complicated.
• Hard to scale to more complex tasks. It is difficult for the
current approaches to scale to more complex tasks that requires
to train a more complex model with more data (e.g. IMAGENET).
This is because, for those tasks the amount of data required is
large in order to obtain a reasonable performance model. If one
would need to subset the data into different partitions, it is likely
to lead to a significant performance degradation.
In this paper, we develop a technique to address the aforemen-
tioned problems, which facilitates the deployment of accurate mod-
els with near zero privacy cost (NZC)when using smooth sensitivity.
Instead of using traditional noisy ArgMax, we propose a new ap-
proach named immutable noisy ArgMax as describe in Section 2.
We redesign the aggregation approach via adding a constant into
the current largest count of the count vector, which enables im-
mutable noisy ArgMax into teacher-student model. As a result, this
method improves both privacy and utility over previous teacher-
student based methods. The primary technical contributions of
this paper is a novel mechanism for aggregating feedback from
the teacher ensemble that are more immutable against larger noise
without changing the consensus of the teachers. We show that our
proposed method improves the performance of student model on
all measures. Overall, our main research contributions are:
• A high performance differential private framework with
very low privacy cost. In this work, we redesign the query
function д, also named as data transformer. We add a constant
c into the voting vector to ensure the ArgMax is immutable
after the noise perturbation. Our proposal can also be viewed as
a generalization of existing teacher-student based work when
c = 0. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed NZC is the first
framework that proposes this mechanism.To further facilitate
research in the area we will make our code publicly available.
• Anewmechanismwith smooth sensitivity. Due to the prop-
erties of the proposed new data transformerr function д, we need
to use the data-dependent analysis approach for the whole pro-
cess. In this paper, we use the smooth sensitivity which leverage
the benefits from the proposed function and the properties of
some specific datasets, and then we can receive an useful query
feedback with a very small privacy cost (ϵ ≈ 0). In addition,
we also discuss three different sensitivity estimation with our
proposed mechanism.
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• Empirical evaluation. We experimentally evaluate the pro-
posed framework NZC on two standard datasets commonly used
to evaluate machine learning models in a wide range of applica-
tions. Our results demonstrate that NZC can build a powerful
student model which outperforms the previous works and give
more realistic solution with our design.
2 PRELIMINARY
In this section, we briefly overview some background related to
deriving our new methods. We first introduce some basics in differ-
ential privacy, followed by the ArgMax and noisy ArgMax mecha-
nism.
2.1 Differential Privacy
To satisfy the increasing demand for preserving privacy, differen-
tial privacy (DP) [12] was proposed as a rigorous principle that
guarantees provable privacy protection and has been extensively
applied [4, 17, 35].
Let f be a deterministic function that maps the dataset D to the
real numbers R. This deterministic function f , under the context
of differential privacy, is called a query function of the dataset D.
For example, the query function may request the mean of a feature
in the dataset, the gender of each sample. The goal in privacy is to
ensure that when the query function is applied on a different but
close datasetD ′, the outputs of the query function are indistinguish-
ably comparing to that from the dataset D such that the private
information of individual entries in the dataset can not be inferred
by malicious attacks. Here, two datasets D and D ′ are regarded
as adjacent datasets when they are identical except for one single
item.
Informally speaking, a randomized data release mechanism for a
query function f is said to ensure DP if “neighboring” inputs induce
similar distributions over the possible outputs of the mechanism.
DP is particularly useful for quantifying privacy guarantees of
queries computed over a database with sensitive entries. The formal
definition of differential privacy is given below.
Definition 1 (Differential Privacy [11, Definition 2.4]). A
randomized mechanismM is (ε,∆)-differentially private if for any
adjacent data D, and D ′, i.e ∥D − D ′∥1 ≤ 1, and any output Y ofM,
we have
Pr[M(D) = Y ] ≤ eε · Pr[M(D ′) = Y ] + ∆. (1)
If ∆ = 0, we say thatM is ε-differentially private. The parameter
ε represents the privacy budget [10] that controls the privacy loss
ofM. A larger value of ε indicates weaker privacy protection.
Definition 2 (Differential Privacy [11, Definition 2.4]). A
randomized mechanismM is (ε,∆S )-differentially private if for any
adjacent data D and D ′, i.e ∥D − D ′∥1 ≤ 1, and any output Y ofM,
we have
c(o;M,aux ,D,D ′) ≜ log Pr[M(aux ,D) = o]Pr[M(aux ,D ′) = o] , (2)
The privacy loss random variableC(M,aux ,D,D ′) is defined as
c(M(d);M,aux ,D,D ′), i.e. the random variable defined by evalu-
ating the privacy loss at an outcome sampled fromM(D).
From the notion of the DP, we know the sensitivity of the de-
terministic function f (i.e. a query function) regarding the dataset
is important for designing the mechanism for the query function.
For different noise mechanisms, it requires different sensitivity
estimation. In previous study of differential private deep learn-
ing, all mechanisms used the classical sensitivity analysis, named
“Global sensitivity”. For example, the ℓ2-norm sensitivity ∆G2 f
of the query function f is used for Gaussian mechanism which is
defined as ∆G2 f = maxD,D′ ∥ f (D) − f (D ′)∥2, where D and D ′ are
two neighboring datasets. For the Laplacian mechanism, it uses the
ℓ1-norm sensitivity ∆G f for random noise sampling. In essence,
when the sensitivity is smaller, it means that the query function
itself is not very distinguishable given different datasets.
A general method for enforcing a query function f with the
(ε,∆G )-differential privacy is to apply additive noise calibrated to
the sensitivity of f . A general method for conveniently ensuring a
deterministic query f to be the (ε,∆G )-differential privacy is via
perturbation mechanisms that add calibrated noise to the query’s
output [9, 13, 16, 28].
Theorem 1 ([14]). If the ℓ1-norm sensitivity of a deterministic
function f is ∆S f , we have:
Mf (D) ≜ f (D) + Lap(
∆G f
ε
), (3)
where Mf preserves (ε, 0)-differential privacy, and Lap(b) is the
Laplacian distribution with location 0 and scale b.
Theorem 2 ([14]). If the ℓ2-norm sensitivity of a deterministic
function f is ∆G2 f , we have:
Mf (D) ≜ f (D) +N(0,∆G2 f
2
σ 2), (4)
where N(0,∆G2 f
2
σ 2) is a random variable obeying the Gaussian
distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation ∆G2 f σ . The ran-
domized mechanismMf (D) is (ε,∆G ) differentially private if σ ≥√
2 ln(1.25/∆G )/ε and ε < 1.
2.2 The ArgMax Mechanism
For any dataset D = {(xk ,yk )}nk=1 The ArgMax Mechanism is
widely used as a query function when v(xk ) ∈ Nd is a vector
of counts of the dimension same to the number of classes d for sam-
ple xk . This decision-making mechanism is similar to the softmax
mechanism of the likelihood for each label, but instead of using
the likelihood as the belief of each label, the ArgMax mechanism
uses the counts given by the teacher ensembles. Immediately, from
the definition of the ArgMax mechanism, we know that the result
given by the ArgMax mechanism is immutable against a constant
translation, i.e.
arg maxv(xk ) = arg max vˆ(xk , c)
vˆ(xk , c)i =
{
v(xk )i if i , arg maxv(xk )
v(xk )i + c otherwise
where we use subscript i to index through the vector.
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2.3 The Noisy ArgMax Mechanism
Now, we want to ensure that the outputs of the given well-trained
teacher ensembles are differentially private. A simple algorithm is
to add independently generated random noise (e.g. independent
Laplacian, Gaussian noise, etc.) to each count and return the index of
the largest noisy count. This noisy ArgMax mechanism, introduced
in [14], is (ε, 0)-differentially private for the query given by the
ArgMax mechanism.
3 OUR APPROACH
In this section, we introduce the specifics of our approach, which is
illustrated in Figure 1. We first show the immutable noisy ArgMax
mechanism, which is at the core of our framework. We then show
how this property of immutable noisy ArgMax can be used in a
differential private teacher-student training framework.
3.1 The Immutable Noisy ArgMax Mechanism
Definition 3 (Immutable Noisy ArgMax Mechanism). Given
a sample x , a count c and voting vector vˆ , when c is a very large
positive constant, the arg max of vˆ(x , c) is unaffected with significant
noise added to the voting vector vˆ(x , c).
One interesting observation from the Noisy ArgMax mechanism
is that when the aggregated results from the teachers are very con-
centrated (i.e. most of the predictions agrees on a certain class) and
of high counts (i.e. large number of teachers), the result from the
ArgMax will not change even under relatively large random noise.
Therefore, the aforementioned scenario is likely to happen in prac-
tice, if all the teacher models have a relatively good performance
on that task. This observation also hints us that if we can make
the largest count much larger than the rest counts, we can achieve
immutability with significant noise.
Let’s define the data transformer as a function that could convert
a dataset into a count vector below:
Definition 4 (Data Transformer). Given any dataset D, the
output of data transformer д is an integer based vector, such as д(D) ∈
Z |r | , where r is the dimension of the vector.
Definition 5 (Distance-nDataTransformer). Given a dataset
D and data transformer functionд, the distancenmeans the difference
between the first and second largest counts given by the д(D) is larger
than n.
Note that, in this paper, for each query, the data transformer
д(D) = дx,c (D) = vˆ(c), where D is the private dataset, x is the
student query, and c is a customized constant by the teacher.
3.2 Smooth Sensitivity
Global Sensitivity Next, we need to add noise to perturb the out-
put of the data transformer. In order to do that, we first need to
estimate the sensitivity of the function. As mentioned in the pre-
liminary, most previous deep learning approach uses the global
sensitivity defined as below:
Definition 6. (Global Sensitivity [15]). For f : D → Rd , for all
D ∈ D, the global sensitivity of f (with respect to the ℓ1 metric) is
∆G f = max
D,D′:d (D,D′)=1
f (D) − f (D ′) .
where D ′ is neighbouring dataset of D and d(·, ·) returns the
distance between two datasets. Global sensitivity is a worst case
definition that does not take into consideration the property of a
particular dataset. This can be seen from the max operator, which
find the maximum distance between the all possible dataset D and
its neighbour dataset D ′. It is not hard to see that if we use global
sensitivity, the ℓ1 distance of the data transformer function д is
c + 1.
Local Sensitivity In global sensitivity, noise magnitude depends
on ∆G f and the privacy parameter ε , but not on the dataset D
itself. This may not be an idea when analyzing data-dependent
schemes, such as the teacher-student framework. The local measure
of sensitivity reflects data-dependent properties and is defined in
the following:
Definition 7. (Local Sensitivity [15]). For f : D → Rd and a
dataset D, the local sensitivity of f (with respect to the ℓ1 metric) is
∆L f = max
D′:d (D,D′)=1
f (D) − f (D ′) .
Note that the global sensitivity ∆G f = maxD ∆L f , for all D ∈
D. While we use the local sensitivity to perturb our query (or
output of function f ), it depends on the properties of the dataset D.
Since it takes into account the data properties, it would be a more
precise estimate when one employs data-dependent approaches.
However, local sensitivity may itself be sensitive, which causes the
perturbed results by local sensitivity does not satisfy the definition
of differential privacy.
Smooth Sensitivity In order to add database-specific noise with
smaller magnitude than the worst-case noise by global sensitivity,
and yet satisfy the differential privacy, we introduce the smooth
sensitivity [28], which upper bounds ∆S f on ∆L f such that adding
noise proportional to ∆S f is safe.
Definition 8. (Smooth Sensitivity [28]). For f : D → Rd , a
dataset D and β > 0, the beta-smooth sensitivity of f is, the local
sensitivity of f is
∆S,β f = max
D′:d (D,D′)=1
(
∆L f (D ′) · e−βd (D,D′)
)
.
It is not hard to see that the ∆S,β f (D) is upper bound of ∆L f (D ′).
Now, the local sensitivity of the data transformer function д, given
dataset D (i.e. ∆Lд) will have two different scales, i.e. 1 or 1 + c–
based on the dataset.∆Lд = 1,д(D ′) is a distance-2 data transformer,
otherwise ∆Lд = 1 + c .
Based on the local sensitivity, we can add a large perturbation
while the voting vector д(D) is the first situation (∆Lд(D ′) = 1 for
all D ′). In this case, even we add a very large noise by giving a
small privacy budget for this specific query, the argmax of д(D)
would not change due to a large constant c added on the index of
the largest count.
By using the smooth sensitivity we can find the β-smooth sen-
sitivity ∆S of data transformer д is not like global sensitivity, but
more like local sensitivity. Given a specific dataset D, β-smooth
sensitivity ∆S f could be 1 × ·e−β , while д(D) is a distance-3 data
transformer function, ensuring the largest local sensitivity of its
neighbouring dataset D ′ is 1: maxD′ ∆Lд(D ′) = 1. Otherwise, the
β-smooth sensitivity ∆Sд could be (1 + c) · e−β .
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Lemma 1. [Noisy ArgMax Immutability] Given any datasetD, fixed
noise perturbation vector and a data transformer function д, the noisy
argmax of both д(D) is immutable while we add a sufficiently large
constant c into the current largest count of д(D).
Lemma 2. [Local Sensitivity with ArgMax Immutability] Given any
dataset D, its adjacent dataset D ′, fixed noise perturbation vector and
a data transformer function д, while ∆Lд = 1 ( or ∆L2д = 1) and the
function д(D) is distance-2 data transformer.
Theorem 3. [Differential private with Noisy ArgMax Immutabil-
ity] Given any dataset D, its adjacent dataset D ′, fixed noise perturba-
tion vector and a data transformer functionд, while ∆Sд = 1 ·e−β and
the function д(D) is distance-3 data transformer, the noisy argmax
of both д(D) and д(D ′) is immutable and the same while we add a
sufficiently large constant c into the current largest count.
The proof of the above lemmas and theorem are provided in
the appendix. In essence, when fed with a neighboring dataset D ′,
if the counts of д(D) is different by n, the output of the ArgMax
mechanism remains unchanged. This immutability to the noise or
difference in counts due to the neighboring datasets, makes the
output of the teacher ensemble unchanged, and thus maintain the
advantage of higher performance in accuracy using the teacher
ensembles.
Discussion From the above theorem, with smooth sensitivity the
distance-3 data transformer д will have ∆S = 1 · e−1 for some
specific dataset. This suggests that for this dataset, when we choose
appropriate c (e.g. a very large constant), it will incur very small
privacy cost. At the same time, the arg max would still preserve
useful information from the teacher ensembles.
3.3 Near-Zero-Cost Query Framework
Now, we are ready to describe our near-zero-cost (NZC) query
framework.To protect the privacy of training data during learn-
ing, NZC transfers knowledge from an ensemble of teacher models
trained on non-overlapping partitions of the data to a student model.
Privacy guarantees may be understood intuitively and expressed
rigorously in terms of differential privacy. The NZC framework
consists of three key parts: (1) an ensemble of n teacher models, (2)
an aggregation and noise perturbation and (3) training of a student
model.
Ensemble of teachers: In the scenario of teacher ensembles for clas-
sification, we first partition the dataset D = {(xk ,yk )}tk=1 into
disjoint sub datasets {Di } and train each teacher Pi separately on
each set, where i = 1, · · · , t , n is the number of the dataset and t is
the number of the teachers.
Aggregation and noise perturbation mechanism: For each sample xk ,
we collect the estimates of the labels given by each teacher, and
construct a count vectorv(xk ) ∈ NL , where each entryvj is given
by vj = |{Pi (xk ) = j;∀i = 1, · · · , t}|. For each mechanism with
fixed sample x , before adding random noise, we choose to add a
c , then we have a new count vector vˆ(x , c). Our motivation is not
to protect x from the student, but protect the dataset D from the
teacher. Basically, if we fix the partition, teacher training and a
query x from the student, then we have data transformer д that
transfers the target dataset D into a count vector. To be more clear,
x and a constant c is used to define the data transformer дx,c and if
we query T times, then we have T different data transformer based
on each query x . Then, by using a data transformer, we can achieve
a count vector vˆ(x , c) = дx,c (D).
Note that, we use the following notation that vˆ(x , c), also shorted
as vˆ , denotes the data transformer with adding a sufficiently large
constant on the largest count, and v(x) denotes the count vector
before adding a sufficiently large constant.
We add Laplacian random noise to the voting counts vˆ(x , c) to
introduce ambiguity:
M(x) ≜ arg max{vˆ(x , c) + Lap(∆
Sд
γ
)},
where, γ is a privacy parameter and Lap(b) the Laplacian distribu-
tion with location 0 and scale b. The parameter γ influences the
privacy guarantee, which we will analyze later.
Gaussian random noise is another choice for perturbing vˆ(x , c)
to introduce ambiguity:
M(x) ≜ arg max{vˆ(x , c) +N(0,∆S2д2σ 2)},
where N(0,σ 2) is the Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and vari-
ance σ 2.
Intuitively, a small γ and large σ lead to a strong privacy guaran-
tee, but can degrade the accuracy of the pre-trained teacher model
and the size of each label in the dataset, as the noisy maximum f
above can differ from the true plurality.
Unlike original noisy argmax, our proposed immutable noisy
argmax will not increase privacy cost with increasing the number
of queries, if we choose a sufficiently large constant c and a large
random noise by setting a very small γ for Laplacian mechanism
(or a large σ for Gaussian mechanism). Therefore, for each query,
it would cost almost zero privacy budget. By utilizing the property
of immutable noisy argmax, we are allowed to have a very large
number of queries with near zero privacy budget (setting c → +∞
and a large random noise for the mechanism).
Student model: The final step is to use the returned information from
the teacher to train a student model. In previous works, due to the
limited privacy budget, one only can query very few samples and
optionally use semi-supervised learning to learn a better student
model. Our proposed approach enables us to do a large number of
queries from the student with near zero cost privacy budget overall.
Like training a teacher model, here, the student model also could
be trained with any learning techniques.
4 PRIVACY ANALYSIS
We now analyze the differential privacy guarantees of our privacy
counting approach. Namely, we keep track of the privacy budget
throughout the student’s training using the moments accountant
(Abadi et al., 2016). When teachers reach a strong quorum, this
allows us to bound privacy costs more strictly.
4.1 Moment Accountant
To better keep track of the privacy cost, we use recent advances in
privacy cost accounting. The moments accountant was introduced
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by [1], building on previous work (Bun and Steinke, 2016; Dwork
and Rothblum, 2016; Mironov, 2016). Definition 3.
Definition 9. LetM : D → R be a randomized mechanism and
D,D ′ a pair of adjacent databases. Let aux denote an auxiliary input.
The moments accountant is defined as:
αM (λ) = max
aux,d,d ′
αM (λ;aux ,D,D ′).
where αM (λ;aux ,D,D ′) = logE[exp(λC(M,aux ,D,D ′))] is the
moment generating function of the privacy loss random variable.
The moments accountant enjoys good properties of composabil-
ity and tail bound as given in [1]:
[Composability] . Suppose that a mechanism M consists of
a sequence of adaptive mechanisms M1, . . . ,Mk , where Mi :∏i−1
j=1 Rj × D → Ri . Then, for any output sequence o1, . . . ,ok−1
and any λ
αM (λ;D,D ′) ≤
k∑
i=1
αMi (λ;o1, . . . ,oi−1,D,D ′).
where αM is conditioned onMi ’s output being oi for i < k .
[Tail bound] For any ϵ > 0, themechanismM is (ϵ,δ )-differential
privacy for
δ = min
λ
exp(αM (λ) − λϵ).
By using the above two properties, we can bound the moments
of randomized mechanism based on each sub-mechanism, and then
convert the moments accountant to (ϵ,δ )-differential privacy based
on the tail bound.
4.2 Analysis of Our Approach
Theorem 4 (LaplacianMechanism with Teacher Ensembles).
Suppose that on neighboring databases D, D ′, the voting counts
v(x , c) differ by at most ∆f in each coordinate. Let Mx,c be the
mechanism that reports arg maxj v(x , c) + Lap(∆f /γ ) . ThenMx,c
satisfies (2γ , 0)-differential privacy. Moreover, for any l , aux , D and
D ′,
α(l ;aux ,D,D ′) ≤ 2γ 2l(l + 1) (5)
For each query x , we use the aggregation mechanism with noise
Lap(∆f /γ )which is (2γ , 0)-DP. Thus overT queries, we get (4Tγ 2+
2γ
√
2T ln 1δ ,δ )-differential privacy [13]. In our approach, we can
choose a very small γ for each mechanism with each query x ,
which leads to very small privacy cost for each query and thus a
low privacy budget. Overall, we cost near zero privacy budget while
γ → 0. Note that, γ is a very small number but is not exactly zero,
and we can set γ to be very small that would result in a very large
noise scale but still smaller than the constant c that we added in
vˆ . Meanwhile, similar results are also used in PATE [29], but both
our work and PATE is based on the proof of [13]. Note that, for
neighboring databases D, D ′, each teacher gets the same training
data partition (that is, the same for the teacher with D and with D ′,
not the same across teachers), with the exception of one teacher
whose corresponding training data partition differs.
The Gaussian mechanism is based on Renyi differential privacy,
and details have been discussed in [30]. Similar to the Laplacian
mechanism, we also get near zero cost privacy budget overall due
to setting a large σ and an even larger constant c .
In the following, we show the relations between constant c with
γ and c with σ in two mechanism while ∆f = 1 (or ∆2 f = 1)
We first recall the following basic facts about the Laplacian and
Gaussian distributions: if ζ ∼ Lap(1/γ ) and ξ ∼ N(0,σ 2), then for
c > 0,
Pr(|ζ | ≥ c) = e−γ c
and
Pr(|ξ | ≥ c) ≤ 2e −c
2
2σ 2 .
Now if each |ζj | < c (resp. |ξ j | < c) for j = 1, ...,L, then the arg max
will not change. We can apply a simple union bound to get an upper
bound on the probability of these events.
Pr( max
j=1, ...,L
|ζj | ≥ c) ≤ Le−γ c
and
Pr( max
j=1, ...,L
|ξ j | ≥ c) ≤ 2Le
−c2
2σ 2 .
Thus to obtain a failure probability at most τ , in the Laplacian case
we can take c = 1γ log(L/τ ), and in the Gaussian case we can take
c =
√
2σ 2 log(2L/τ ).
5 EXPERIMENTS
In this section, we evaluate our proposed method along with previ-
ously proposed models.
5.1 Experimental Setup
We perform our experiments on two widely used datasets on dif-
ferential privacy: SVHN [26] and MNIST [22]. MNIST and SVHN
are two well-known digit image datasets consisting of 60K and
73K training samples, respectively. We use the same data partition
method and train the 250 teacher models as in [29]. In more detail,
for MNIST, we use 10,000 samples as the student dataset, and split it
into 9,000 and 1,000 as a training and testing set for the experiment.
For SVHN, we use 26,032 samples as the student dataset, and split it
into 10,000 and 16,032 as training and testing set. For both MNIST
and SVHN, the teacher uses the same network structure as in [29].
5.2 Results on Teacher Ensembles
We primarily compare with [29], which also employs a teacher-
student framework and has demonstrated strong performance. We
did not compare with work from [30] because the improvements
are more on the privacy budget and the improvement of student
performance on tasks are marginal1. We used implementation from
the official Github2, however, we are unable to reproduce the semi-
supervised results. Therefore, in the following, we compare the
result under fully supervised setting for both approaches.
The results on MNIST and SVHN datasets are shown in table 1.
It is clear that the proposed approach achieves both better accuracy
andmuch better privacy cost. In particular, the results are very close
to the baseline results, where the student is trained by using the
non-perturbed votes from the teacher ensembles. The main reason
1The open source implementation given in https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy only
generates table 2 in the original paper from [30], which does not provide any model
performance.
2https://github.com/tensorflow/privacy
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Dataset Aggregator Queries Privacy Accuracyanswered bound ε Student Clean Votes Ground Truth
MNIST
LNMax (γ=20) 100 2.04 63.5%
94.5% 98.1%
LNMax (γ=20) 1,000 8.03 89.8%
LNMax (γ=20) 5,000 > 8.03 94.1%
LNMax (γ=20) 9,000 > 8.03 93.4%
NZC (c = 1e100, γ = 1e10) 9,000 ≈ 0 95.1%
NZC (5 teachers only) 9,000 ≈ 0 97.8% 97.5%
SVHN
LNMax (γ=20) 500 5.04 54.0%
85.8% 89.3%
LNMax (γ=20) 1,000 8.19 64.0%
LNMax (γ=20) 5,000 > 8.19 79.5%
LNMax (γ=20) 10,000 > 8.19 84.6%
NZC (c = 1e100, γ = 1e10) 10,000 ≈ 0 85.7%
NZC (5 teachers only) 10,000 ≈ 0 87.1% 87.1%
Table 1: Classification accuracy and privacy of the students. LNMax refers to the method from [29]. The number of teachers
is set to 250 unless otherwise mentioned. We set δ = 10−5 to compute values of ε (to the exception of SVHN where δ = 10−6).
Clean votes refers to a student that are trained from the noiseless votes from all teachers. Ground truth refers to a student
that are trained with ground truth query labels.
MNIST SVHN
LNMax NZC Clean LNMax NZC Clean
93.02% 94.33% 94.37% 87.11% 88.08% 88.06%
Table 2: Label accuracy of teacher ensembles when com-
pared to the ground truth labels fromvariousmethods using
250 teachers. Clean denotes the aggregation without adding
any noise perturbation.
is that NZC is more robust against the random perturbations for
most of the queries, which helps the student to obtain better quality
labels for training. We also achieved strong privacy cost, because
our approach allows us to use a very large noise scale, as long
as the constant c is set to a proper large value. To check if the
above intuition is true, we calculate the number of correctly labeled
queries from the teacher ensembles, and the result is shown in
table 2. It is quite clear that our approach is more robust against
noise perturbation as compared to the previous approach.
5.3 Parameter Analysis
The number of teachers would have a significant impact on the
performance of the student, as the teachers were trained on non-
overlapping split of the data. The more number of teachers, the less
data a teacher has to train. This leads to less accurate individual
teachers, and thus less likely to have correct vote for the query. As
can be seen from Fig 2a, the performance of the teacher ensem-
bles decreases as the number of teachers increases. This is more
prominent for more challenging datasets (e.g. SVHN performance
drops more significantly as compared to MNIST). We would like
to note that, although the number of qualified samples increases
as the number of teachers increase (see Fig 2c), it is at the cost of
increasing the wrongly labeled queries, since the total accuracy
of teachers has decreased. Because of this, it is likely to result in
worse student performance. However, the previous approach such
as PATE [29] or Scale PATE [30] requires large number of teachers
due to privacy budget constraints. Our approach does not have
this limitation. Therefore, we experimented with fewer number
of teachers and the results are shown in Table 2. The results from
using less teachers improved significantly, and approaches closer to
the performance when the training student with the ground truth.
(%) 1 5 10 25 50 100 250
MNIST 98.99 98.31 96.71 95.03 91.94 91.45 81.18
SVHN 93.99 93.21 91.2 88.93 85.78 82.7 75.93
Table 3: Average label accuracy of teachermodels when com-
pared to the ground truth labels fromvariousmethods using
250 teachers.
5.4 Discussion
As can be observed from the results, benefiting from the proposed
mechanismwith smooth sensitivity,NZC can use much less number
of teacher models, which leads to better performance of individual
teacher models due to larger amount of training data available to
each model. A well-trained deep learning model requires much
larger dataset scale when the task is more challenging (e.g. see [27,
34]). In this case, our proposedNZC offers amore appealing solution
for more challenging real world applications that requires more
data to train. As our approach allows one to obtain good performing
student model as well as low privacy budget by using less number of
teachers, which in turn leads to improved performance of individual
teacher (see Table 3). It is also interesting to note that, PATE can be
viewed as a special case of our proposal, when we use distance-0
data transformer.
6 RELATEDWORK
Differential privacy is increasingly regarded as a standard privacy
principle that guarantees provable privacy protection [6]. Early
work adopting differential privacy focus on restricted classifiers
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(a) Number of teachers versus Performance (b) Distance-n versus Qualified Samples with 250
Teachers
(c) Distance-3 Qualified Samples versus Number
of Teachers
Figure 2: (a) shows the trade-off between number of teachers and the performance of the teacher ensemble; (b) shows the
percentage of qualified sample which satisfy the distance-n inwhole dataset when using 250 teachers; (c) shows the percentage
of distance-3 qualified samples over the dataset.
with convex loss [5, 7, 19, 31, 33]. Stochastic gradient descent with
differentially private updates is first discussed in [33]. The author
starts to perturb each gradient update by random exponential noise.
Then, [1] proposed DP-SGD, a new optimizer by carefully adding
random Gaussian noise into stochastic gradient descent for privacy-
preserving for deep learning approaches. At each step of DP-SGD
by given a set random of examples, it needs to compute the gradient,
clip the l2 norm of each gradient, add random Gaussian noise for
privacy protection, and updates the model parameters based on
the noisy gradient. Meanwhile, DP-SGD proved the new moments
account that gets the more precise privacy estimation.
Intuitively, DP-SGD could be easily adopted with most existing
deep neural network models built on the SGD optimizer. Based
on DP-SGD [2] applies differential privacy on distributed stochas-
tic gradient descent to achieve both communicate efficiency and
privacy-preserving. [24] applies differential privacy to LSTM lan-
guage models by combining federated learning and differential
private SGD to guarantee user-level privacy.
[29] proposed a general approach by aggregation of teacher
ensembles (PATE) that uses the teacher models’ aggregate voting
decisions to transfer the knowledge for student model training. Our
main framework is also inspired by PATE with a modification to the
aggregation mechanism. In order to solve the privacy issues, PATE
adds carefully-calibrated Laplacian noise on the aggregate voting
decisions between the communication. To solve the scalability of
the original PATE model, [30] proposed an advanced version of
PATE by optimizing the voting behaviors from teacher models with
Gaussian noise. PATE-GAN [21] applies PATE to GANs to provide
privacy guarantee for generate data over the original data. However,
existing PATE or Scale PATE have spent much privacy budget and
train lots of teacher models. Our new approach overcomes these
two limitations and achieved better performance on both accuracy
and privacy budget. Compared with PATE and our model, DP-SGD
is not a teacher-student model.
[28] first proposed the smooth sensitivity and proof the DP guar-
antee under the data-dependent privacy analysis. Then [29, 30] use
the similar idea to study use the data-dependent under different
scenarios. Compared with global sensitivity, the smooth sensitivity
always shows more precise and accurate sensitivity which allows
adding less noise perturbation per query. Finally, data-dependent
differential privacy can improve both performance and privacy cost
in DP area. This is also our recommendation used on the proposed
mechanism in this work.
7 CONCLUSION
We propose a novel voting mechanism with smooth sensitivity –
the immutable noisy ArgMax, which enables stable output with
tolerance to very large noise. Based on this mechanism, we propose
a simple but effective method for differential privacy under the
teacher-student framework using smooth sensitivity. Our method
benefits from the noise tolerance property of the immutable noisy
ArgMax, which leads to near zero cost privacy budget. Theoretically,
we provide detailed privacy analysis for the proposed approach.
Empirically, our method outperforms previous methods both in
terms of accuracy and privacy budget.
A PROOFS
Lemma 1. [Noisy ArgMax Immutability] Given any datasetD, fixed
noise perturbation vector and a data transformer function д, the noisy
argmax of both д(D) is immutable while we add a sufficiently large
constant c into the current largest count of д(D).
Proof. First, let us recall some facts discussed in the main paper.
We first recall the following basic facts about the Laplacian and
Gaussian distributions: if ζ ∼ Lap(1/γ ) and ξ ∼ N(0,σ 2), then for
c > 0,
Pr(|ζ | ≥ c) = e−γ c
and
Pr(|ξ | ≥ c) ≤ 2e −c
2
2σ 2 .
Now if each |ζj | < c (resp. |ξ j | < c) for j = 1, ...,L, then the arg max
will not change. We can apply a simple union bound to get an upper
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bound on the probability of these events.
Pr( max
j=1, ...,L
|ζj | ≥ c) ≤ Le−γ c
and
Pr( max
j=1, ...,L
|ξ j | ≥ c) ≤ 2Le
−c2
2σ 2 .
Thus to obtain a failure probability at most τ , in the Laplacian case
we can take c = 1γ log(L/τ ), and in the Gaussian case we can take
c =
√
2σ 2 log(2L/τ ).
Sincewe have a sufficiently large constant c , c >>
√
2σ 2 log(2L/τ )
or c >> 1γ log(L/τ ), then c minus any sampled noise from either
Gaussian or Laplacian distribution is larger than 0 with 1 − τ prob-
ability, where we could set τ as a very small number which is close
to 0. Then, the largest count of д(D) adds a positive number which
not change the argmax result. □
Lemma 2. [Local Sensitivity with ArgMax Immutability] Given any
dataset D, its adjacent dataset D ′, fixed noise perturbation vector and
a data transformer function д, while ∆Lд = 1 ( or ∆L2д = 1) and the
function д(D) is distance-2 data transformer.
Proof. First, we have∆f = 1 (or∆2 f = 1) and the functionд(D)
is distance-2 data transformer. For any adjacent D ′, arg maxд(D) =
arg maxд(D ′) is immutable, since д(D ′) can only modify 1 count
due to the ∆f = 1. However, the distance is larger than 2, then any
modification of д(D ′) would not change the argmax. Assume the
argmax will be changed, let us use д(D)j∗ presents the largest count
and д(D)j presents the second largest count:
д(D)j∗ − 1 < д(D)j + 1,
д(D)j∗−д(D)j < 2,
which is conflict the distance-2 ofд(D) for any cases. Then we prove
that д(D) and д(D ′) have the same argmax. □
Theorem 3. [Differential private with Noisy ArgMax Immutabil-
ity] Given any dataset D, its adjacent dataset D ′, fixed noise perturba-
tion vector and a data transformer functionд, while ∆Sд = 1 ·e−β and
the function д(D) is distance-3 data transformer, the noisy argmax
of both д(D) and д(D ′) is immutable and the same while we add a
sufficiently large constant c into the current largest count.
Proof. Given a datasetD, by using Lemma 2, the local sensitivity
of all neighbouring data D ′ is 1, while д(D ′) is distance-2 data
transformer for all D ′. Apparently, it requires the д(D) is a distance-
3 data transformer to ensure the upper bound of smooth sensitivity
of д(D ′) is 1 for all D ′.
By using Lemma 1, we can see that after adding a sufficiently
large count and noise perturbation will also not change the argmax
information for both д(D) and д(D ′). Then, we have the same
argmax return over any D, D ′ and DP also holds. □
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